The Identity Consolidator offers “Privacy-Preserving Attribute Based Access Control (PABAC)”, on top of the OpenID Connect specification, with the Credential Management module and taking advantage of the idemix and Uprove Cryptographic credential stacks. PABAC enables SPs that are not aware of our privacy-preserving cryptographic credentials stack to allow end-users to use cryptographic credentials in order to get access to their services and/or resources. To achieve this, we need a cryptographic credential issuing ldp and a verifying ldp. Users can request the issuance of a cryptographic credential for one or more identity attributes from the issuing ldp, which can be the IDC itself that runs the cryptographic credential issuer stack. The verifying IdP acts as an Idemix/U-Prove verifier able to verify cryptographic credentials while the SPs continue to run the vanilla OpenID Connect protocol. In other words, the user requests the issuance of a cryptographic credential of one or more user identity attributes from an issuing IdP (e.g., student and over 21). When the user tries to authenticate to an SP, she triggers a session with a cryptographic credential verifying IdP in order for that Verifying IdP to verify the validity of the cryptographic credential. Subsequently, the verifying IdP assures the SP that the user is a holder of a credential that proves that she is a student and is over 21 years old. After this seamless to the user authentication procedure, the user can have access to the service/resources of the SP, knowing that his anonymity is preserved and no more than the needed identity attributes have been revealed to that SP. Additionally, federated PABAC offers two concepts of anonymity, namely untraceability and unlinkability. This means that that no SP or IdP can track or link any credentials to the user or the other way around. For example, consider the scenario that a user shows a combination of two independent and non-uniquely identifying attributes to an IdP and an SP at time A. If that same user proves the same combination of two cryptographic credentials to another IdP and SP at time B, there is no mechanism that can infer or assure that the user of time A and time B is indeed the same person. This entails untraceability and the users’ credentials cannot be linked. This also means that no IdP or SP can build a complete profile of that user since every issuing and verifying session is different.
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